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When you come to a fork in the road, take it. 
— Yogi Berra 
In the wake of the publication of Alan Gross’s The Rhetoric of 
Science, a debate ensued concerning the role of rhetoric in the 
analysis of science (Gross, 1990). It concerned Gross’s claim that 
science was rhetoric all the way down. The debate culminated in 
Rhetorical Hermeneutics, a book collection edited by Gross and 
William Keith (Gross and Keith, 1997). Featured was a lengthy 
essay by Dilip Gaonkar, an argument deeply skeptical of the 
possibility of a rhetoric of science in any shape or form. Gaonkar 
averred that rhetoric was, simply, not equal to the task of analyzing 
an enterprise so complex. Rhetoric was, Gaonkar asserted, not an 
analytic, but a productive art. Forced to do duty analytically, it 
revealed only how impoverished its machinery was. Rhetoric of 
science may be dismissed, however, only if we accept Gaonkar’s 
view of rhetoric. Rhetorical analysis is more than the mobilization 
of an analytical apparatus; it is also an orientation toward the 
persuasiveness of concepts that the philosopher W.D. Gallie calls 
“essentially contested.” To Gallie, what counts as science will never 
be settled: arguments concerning its nature and scope will never 
cease. For Gallie, this is to say that  
a certain piece of evidence or argument, put forward by 
one side in an apparently endless dispute, can be 
recognized to have a definite logical force, even by those 
it fails to win over, or convert to the side in question; and 
that when this is the case, the conversion of a hitherto 
wavering opponent of the side in question can be seen to 
be justifiable (Gallie, 1968, 185). 
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Gallie’s is an argument about what science is, not what it produces: 
its facts and theories.  
In this paper, I will agree with Gallie that, once they are 
effectively beyond argument, these facts and theories are not 
essentially contested; to view them so is a category mistake. While a 
great deal of science is properly an agonistic field, open to 
rhetorical analysis, it is not open to debate that there is a periodic 
table, or that DNA has the structure it most certainly has. In other 
words, I wish to contend that the rhetoricity of science is time 
sensitive. There was a time when the earth was on good scientific 
grounds thought not to be old enough for evolution to have 
occurred. Radioactivity had not been taken into account; it had not 
yet been discovered. The goal of science is to place its claims 
beyond argument. I think it is incontestable that, on occasion, it 
succeeds, as with evolutionary theory. When it does, rhetoric can 
have no purchase, since no legitimate forum for debate exists as a 
target for such analysis.  
In this paper, I will look at three contrasting cases, the discovery 
of the reproductive process of DNA, a case in which an existing 
agonistic field eventually disappears; Robert Hooke’s 
Micrographia, in which science and rhetoric exist side by side, the 
former making substantial progress toward facts and theories that 
are beyond argument, the latter barred forever from reaching that 
goal. Hooke’s deliberative contention is that science, far from being 
subversive to religion, reveals the details of God’s handiwork. In the 
third case, global warming, science policy is at issue. While the 
disappearance of uncertainty signals the termination of the 
appropriateness of rhetorical analysis for the science, the political 
issues that remain are very much a target.  
The Structure of DNA and the Progress of Science 
It does not seem possible to argue against the theory that bacteria 
and viruses cause many diseases; it does not seem possible to argue 
against the periodicity of the elements or against the conversion of 
mass and energy embodied in Einstein’s famous equations. It does 
not seem possible to argue against some forms of scientific 
progress: that astronomy gets closer to the truth as we move from 
Ptolemy to Copernicus to Kepler to Newton; that chemistry 
progresses as we move from Lavoisier to Pauling; that continental 
drift progresses from Wegener’s unlikely geophysics to the reality of 
sea-floor spreading. The discovery of the structure of DNA and, 
following that, the discovery of the means by which it reproduces, 
show us just how science progresses and how its achievements 
become more and more robust, less and less subject to 
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argumentative challenge until, at some point, this sense of certainty 
is so considerable that it is beyond challenge altogether. In other 
words, there is a firm consensus. But it is vital to point out that this 
consensus is achieved not by negotiation but by interactions among 
scientists, their equipment, and the material world, interactions 
whose results are persuasive only because they are replicable. While 
science is without doubt a social phenomenon, and while scientific 
practices are without question socially constructed, it does not 
follow that the products of these practices are socially constructed 
as well. Only a global and implausible skepticism would deny the 
reality of electrons. If they can be used as tools—and they can be—
then they are as real as hammers and nails. On these matters, there 
is, as philosopher Bernard Williams says, a convergence that is, 
importantly, uncoerced (Williams, 1985, 171). Moreover, there is no 
variation in this consensus from culture to culture, from ethnic 
group to ethnic group. There is no Chinese science, there is no 
Jewish science, and there never will be. 
When they first proposed the structure of DNA, Watson and 
Crick were appropriately cautious: “The previously published X-ray 
data on deoxyribose nucleic acid are insufficient for a rigorous test 
of our structure. So far as we can tell, it is roughly compatible with 
the experimental data, but it must be regarded as unproved until it 
has been checked against more exact results” (Watson and Crick, 
1953a, 737). However, throwing caution aside, they speculated that 
“the specific base pairing we have postulated immediately suggests 
a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material.” In a 
subsequent paper, they are specific about the nature of this copying 
mechanism, later known as semi-conservative replication:  
We imagine that prior to duplication the hydrogen bonds 
are broken, and the two chains unwind and separate. 
Each chain then acts as a template for the formation 
onto itself of a new companion chain, so that eventually 
we shall have two pairs of chains, where we had only one 
before. Moreover, the sequence of base pairs will have 
been duplicated exactly (Watson and Crick, 1953b, 966; 
emphasis theirs). 
This was not the only scheme of duplication in contention. Gunther 
Stent hypothesized a conservative mechanism, one in which a new 
strand of RNA would develop within the physical confines of the 
DNA double helix. When fully formed, this strand would separate 
and combine with another of RNA. Together, these two strands 
would form a template that would stamp out other DNA double 
helices. Max Delbrück suggested another scheme, dispersion, in 
which new double helices would form when existing helical chains 
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broke and then rejoined at “growth points.” In the chains thus 
produced, new and existing DNA would alternate. Delbrück also 
made an important contribution by suggesting a test that would 
differentiate decisively among the three hypotheses: if the parent 
strains could be labeled in some way, the daughter strains would 
exhibit a clear differential distribution.  
Four years after this suggestion was made, it was realized in an 
experimental program, famously referred to as “the most beautiful 
experiment in biology” (Holmes, 2001). After rejecting various 
alternative labelings, two young scientists, Matthew Meselson and 
Franklin Stahl, incorporated a heavy isotope of nitrogen, N15, into 
the DNA of the bacterium Escherichia coli. After fourteen 
generations, the E. coli with its heavier DNA was transferred to a 
medium in which E. coli incorporated standard nitrogen, N14, with 
its slightly lower atomic weight. The hope was that the distribution 
of labels and, therefore, of weights, in the contrasting generations 
of daughter molecules would decisively differentiate among the 
three hypotheses. Only in the case of Watson-Crick’s hypothesis 
would Meselson and Stahl obtain daughter generations of purely 
hybrid (N14/N15) DNA molecules, followed by daughter generations 
consisting of an equal mix of hybrid and N14 DNA molecules. In 
contrast, Stent’s hypothesis predicted the presence of N15 DNA 
throughout succeeding generations; Delbrück’s, predicted neither 
hybrids, nor pure N15, nor pure N14 DNA in succeeding generations. 
These differences in atomic weight are minute; at the time, they 
could not be detected even with the most delicate of balances, but 
only by means of an ultracentrifuge, a machine that spins at an 
incredible 44,770 revolutions per minute. This is the equivalent of 
as much as 289,000 times the force of gravity. During 
centrifugation the DNA is concentrated in the solution and forms a 
band whose position depends on its weight. As a consequence of 
this density-gradient centrifugation, after a day or two DNA 
molecules suspended in a solution of a heavy cousin of sodium 
chloride, cesium chloride (CsCl), are separated according to their 
weight. Meselson and Stahl visualized the result for further analysis 
by use of an automatic camera whose result is seen in Figure 1.  
In the first ten photographs in the sequence (generations 0 to 
4.1), we see the stages of bacterial growth from generation to 
generation. The one dark band in the top photograph represents 
pure N15 DNA. In the second photograph, another, lighter density 
gradient (hybrid N14/N15 DNA) appears to the left of the first (N15 
DNA). In the third, the initial density gradient begins to fade; in the 
fourth, the first daughter generation, it completely disappears, and 
the hybrid alone remains. As we move toward the second daughter 
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generation—photographs five through eight—a new, lighter density 
gradient appears to the left and grows in intensity, indicating the 
presence of hybrid N14/N15 and N14 DNA alone, confirming Watson 
and Crick’s hypothesis. In photographs nine and ten, this has 
become the dominant density gradient. The graphs in Figure 1 
depict the same sequence in a different visual modality, where the 
peaks represent the concentration of DNA in the bands.  
 
Figure 1. Photographs of DNA bands formed after centrifugation and 
graphs of band density (Meselson and Stahl, 1958, 312). On the left 
side of this figure (a), we see DNA bands showing density gradients 
for the various “generations” listed in the right-hand column. Density 
increases as we move from left to right. On the right side (b), we see 
microdensometer tracings of these DNA bands. The height above the 
base line of these tracings corresponds to the concentration of DNA.  
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Meselson and Stahl’s experiment was designed to provide 
evidence for decisively selecting one among three hypotheses in 
contention: Watson-Crick’s, Stent’s, or Delbrück’s, each predicting 
a particular experimental result. The result obtained supported 
Watson-Crick’s hypothesis, and undermined the hypotheses of 
Delbrück and Stent. The eliminative induction by which they argue 
can be modeled as a deductive process:  
If hypothesis A is the case, x will be the result. 
If hypothesis B is the case, y will be the result. 
If hypothesis C is the case, z will be the result.  
The result is x. 
Therefore, A is the case. 
The apodeictic quality of this conclusion, however, is an illusion. 
There is no guarantee that the correct hypothesis is among those 
being tested, that another hypothesis, also compatible with the 
experimental evidence, is really the correct choice. Secondly, there 
is always the possibility that equipment whose proper functioning 
has been taken for granted has, in fact, malfunctioned; perhaps the 
ultracentrifuge was improperly calibrated. Thirdly, it may be the 
case that one of the procedures by which Meselson and Stahl 
obtained or manipulated their DNA introduced a variable of which 
they were not aware, one that compromised their result. 
Nevertheless, a general consensus concerning the means of DNA 
reproduction was soon achieved. 
Consensus, even general consensus, is, of course, not truth. 
Once, there was a general consensus that the earth did not rotate on 
its axis; it endured for many centuries. In the Almagest, for 
example, Ptolemy dismisses the earth’s rotation as “ridiculous.” He 
finds unbelievable the idea that the heavier earth moves while the 
lighter air remains still. Moreover, if the earth rotates from west to 
east on its axis—at a speed of about 1000 miles an hour—it would 
mean that clouds could never be seen to move toward the east. But 
that is not the whole of Ptolemy’s story. He admits that “there is 
nothing in the celestial phenomena which would count against that 
hypothesis [of rotation],” conceding thereby that the question of the 
earth’s motion is, in fact, a matter of contention, that it is not 
beyond argument (Ptolemy, 1984, 44–45). 
The general consensus concerning the structure of DNA was 
consensus of another kind than that achieved by sheer argument, 
by negotiation, or by indoctrination. When first announced, it is 
true, the structure was only a model that was both consistent with 
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the facts and mechanically feasible. At first, then, “the sense that a 
molecule of this structure exists at all, the sense of its reality, is an 
effect only of words, numbers, and pictures judiciously used with 
persuasive effect” (Gross, 1990, 54). But this state of affairs was 
temporary. Molecular biology progressed, and as it did, as the 
successful encounters between scientists and the world mounted, 
the robustness of the original model increased to a point at which 
its reality was no longer open to challenge. In helping to reach this 
goal, Meselson and Stahl’s experiment accomplished two tasks: 
first, it chose decisively among competing models of reproduction; 
second, in so doing, it increased our confidence that Watson and 
Crick’s structure was itself correct. Meselson and Stahl’s was the 
first considerable step in the direction of a robustness currently so 
overwhelming that the reality of the molecule’s structure has 
become permanently beyond argument. 
Hooke’s Micrographia: Science and Rhetoric 
Side by Side 
There exist two explorations of Hooke’s rhetoric, articles by John T. 
Harwood and Jordynn Jack. In “Rhetoric and Graphics in 
Micrographia,” Harwood sees the book’s many images as central. 
These create meaning in interaction with their accompanying 
verbal descriptions. He sees these interactive complexes as a form 
of the classical figure, enargia, a term he interprets correctly as 
vivid description. Enargia, which surfaces first in the anonymous 
Ad Herennium, re-appears in Cicero’s De Oratorio, and in 
Quintilian’s Institutes. An example from Ad Herennium illustrates 
the central characteristics of the figure, its emphasis on drama and 
emotional impact. The subject is the assassination of Tiberius 
Gracchus: 
When Gracchus begins a prayer to the gods, these 
creatures in a rush attack him, coming together from all 
quarters, and a man in the crowd shouts: “Fly, Tiberius, 
fly! Don’t you see? Look behind you, I say!” Then the 
fickle mob, stricken with sudden fear, take to flight. But 
this fellow, frothing crime from his mouth, breathing 
forth cruelty from the depth of his lungs, swings his arm, 
and, while Gracchus wonders what it means, but still 
does not move from the place where he stood, strikes 
him on the temple. Gracchus does not impair his inborn 
manliness by a single cry, but falls without uttering a 
sound. The assassin, bespattered with the pitiable blood 
of the bravest of heroes, looks about him as if he had 
done a most admirable deed, gaily extends his 
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murderous hand to his followers as they congratulate 
him and betakes himself to the temple of Jupiter (Page, 
ed., 1956 IV.lv.68).  
This passage may be compared with one from Micrographia 
describing the louse depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Robert Hooke’s louse. (Micrographia, 1961, fold-out, end-
papers). 
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Under the microscope, Hooke notices 
that it is a creature of very odd shape; it has a head like 
that expressed in the 35th scheme, marked with A, which 
seems almost conical, but is a little flatted on the upper 
and undersides, at the biggest part of which, on either 
side behind the head (as it were, being the place where 
other creatures’ ears stand) are placed its two black 
shining goggle eyes BB, looking backwards, and fenced 
around with several small cilia or hairs that encompass 
it, so that it seems this creature has no very good 
foresight. It does not seem to have any eyelids, and 
therefore perhaps its eyes were so placed that it might 
the better cleanse them with its fore-legs; and perhaps 
this may be the reason why they so much avoid and run 
from the light behind them, for being made to live in the 
shady and dark recesses of the hair, and hence probably 
their eyes having a great aperture, the open and clear 
light, especially that of the sun, must needs very much 
offend them (Hooke, 1961, 211). 
Both passages have in common that Cicero’s criterion for enargia 
that “these things, which you have not seen with your eyes, you can 
see with your mind” (Cicero, quoted in Quintilian 2001, 57). In Ad 
Herennium, you are a by-stander to a scene from the past; in 
Hooke, you and he together are peering through the same 
microscope. But there the parallelism ends. Ad Herennium is 
deliberately engaging, dramatic, selective, its unwavering goal a 
vividness that evokes pity, terror, and indignation. Not so Hooke, 
who does not merely describe; he over-describes; he is not simply 
undramatic; he is anti-dramatic. In short, Harwood has made a 
category mistake. Enargia does not belong in a work of science. 
The job of scientific prose is exhaustively to describe the anatomy of 
the louse, to see this creature under a particular description: the 
louse as a living machine. Hooke’s prose is designed to be 
transparent: readers are meant to see through it verbiage directly to 
the object of study. Prose that called attention to itself would only 
distract from this purpose.  
There is another significant difference. Ad Herennium is 
dramatizing the behavior of Gracchus and his assassins; Hooke is 
not describing a louse, but the louse, not an individual, but a 
species.  
At this point, a rhetorician might object: Haven’t I shown that 
Hooke’s prose is in its own way just as rhetorical as Cicero’s? And 
isn’t its transparency just an illusion this prose is designed to 
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foster? My claim is the target of these objections only because I 
have so far ignored the most important “words” in Hooke’s passage: 
“A” and “B.” These majuscule letters are deictic: they point to the 
object of study. Reading Hooke’s description in conjunction with 
his engraving we are not merely reading; we are engaging in a 
virtual practice. Images are central to Micrographia because they 
participate in a system that re-creates the practice exemplified by 
each of Hooke’s observations. It is not, as Steven Shapin and Simon 
Schaffer famously assert, that we are virtual witnesses; rather, we 
are virtual participants in a practice Hooke performs and advocates 
(Shapin and Schaffer, 1985, 60–61).  
What is a practice? It is not an example of knowing what, but of 
knowing how and of doing accordingly. Knowing what is never 
sufficient for a practice. Also, a practice is not like a habit, routinely 
reiterated; rather, it is a succession of actions oriented toward a 
consciously held goal, actions shaped and re-shaped by experience, 
and superintended always by intelligence. Mountaineering is a 
practice: 
A mountaineer walking over ice-covered rocks in a high 
wind in the dark does not move his limbs by blind habit; 
he thinks what he is doing, he is ready for emergencies, 
he economizes in effort, he makes tests and experiments; 
in short he walks with some degree of skill and 
judgment. If he makes a mistake, he is inclined not to 
repeat it, and if he finds a new trick effective he is 
inclined to continue to use it and to improve upon it. He 
is concomitantly walking and teaching himself to walk in 
conditions of this sort. It is of the essence of habitual 
practices that one performance is a replica of its 
predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligent practices 
that one performance is modified by its predecessors. 
The agent is still learning (Ryle, 1949, 42). 
Hooke’s practice of microscopy is exactly parallel:  
Of these kind of objects there is much more difficulty to 
discover the true shape than of those visible to the naked 
eye, the same object seeming quite differing in one 
position to the light from what it really is and may be 
discovered in another. And therefore I never begin to 
make any draft [drawing] before by many examinations 
in several lights and several positions to those lights, I 
have discovered the true form. For it is exceeding 
difficult in some objects to distinguish between a 
prominence and a depression, between a shadow and a 
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black stain, or a reflection and a whiteness in the color 
(Hooke, 1961, xxviii). 
This is intelligent seeing. It is only such a practice, as philosopher 
Ian Hacking says, that “creates the ability to distinguish between 
visible artifacts of the preparation and the instrument, and the real 
structure that is seen with the microscope” (Hacking, 1983, 191). 
Although Hooke’s engravings are an important precursor of the 
images that appear in today’s scientific journals, they fail the test of 
complete transparency. As science progresses, so does its 
communication. Hooke tells us that the engravings are largely 
accurate representations of his drawings (Hooke, 1961, xviii). But 
scientific illustrations should do more than that; they should reveal 
not only what Hooke sees but what he can legitimately infer about 
the structures the microscope reveals. Scientific images should be 
about both sight and insight. But Hooke’s engravers employ tricks 
of shading that create the illusion of three-dimensionality. This 
illusion is, from a scientific point of view, a distraction. Compare 
Figure 3, a recent depiction of the louse’s left antenna with its 
depiction in Figure 2. In Figure 3, all the parts are labelled, and no 
visual distractions are evident. Comparing Figures 2 and 3, we see 
the result of several centuries of evolution in scientific 
communication. Figure 3 places some aspects of louse anatomy, at 
last, beyond argument. 
 
Figure 3. Dorsal view of a louse left antenna. Labelled c in Figure 1 
(Steinbrecht, 1994, 260). 
What it is to be a virtual participant in this interaction between 
words and images? Some analytical apparatus borrowed from Alan 
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Gross and Joseph Harmon’s Science from Sight to Insight will 
allow me to address the question (Gross and Harmon, 2014). Gross 
and Harmon make use of five principles of Gestalt theory. Figure 
and ground allow us to differentiate the louse from its shadow; 
good continuation allows us to experience the human hair to which 
the louse clings as a single entity; contrast allows us to differentiate 
the human hair from the louse that clings to it; enclosure allows us 
to experience individually each of the jointed parts of the louse’s 
body; Prägnatz allows us to experience these parts as segments of a 
whole.  
Gross and Harmon also employ scanning and matching theory. 
It is scanning and matching that allows us to move meaningfully 
from text to image and back, allows us to see under a certain 
description. For example, we see the part of the image that AA 
designates as “a head … which seems almost conical, but is a little 
flatted on the upper and underside” (Hooke, 1961, 211). Finally, 
Gross and Harmon employ Peircian semiotics. Semiotics allows us 
to track the transformations Hooke’s louse undergoes. The louse is 
iconic: Hooke depicts the creature with all the accuracy of which he 
is capable. Hooke’s image is also indexical: he shows us, not only 
how the louse looks, but how its various components work together 
to create a way of life. Hooke’s image is finally symbolic: one louse 
represents all lice. It is symbolic in another sense; it stands for the 
scope and power of microscopy.  
In Micrographia’s “Preface,” Hooke invites his readers to 
practice microscopy, for “gentlemen of our nation, whose leisure 
makes them fit to undertake, and the plenty of their fortunes to 
accomplish, extraordinary things in this way” (Hooke, 1961, xix). 
Hooke is saying that the practice of microscopy can be learned. 
When it is, it will unequivocally demonstrate the truth of his claims: 
not only does the louse look exactly as he depicts it; it functions 
exactly as he describes it. It is a mechanism, a living machine. 
Microscopy moves us decisively “towards the increase of the 
operative and mechanical knowledge to which the age seems so 
much inclined, because we may perhaps be enabled to discern all 
the secret workings of nature, almost in the same manner as we do 
those that are the productions of art, and are managed by wheels, 
and engines, and springs that were devised by human wit” (Hooke, 
1961, viii). 
We have so far have treated Micrographia as a gallery of images 
accompanied by their descriptions, theory-free except for the 
implication that living things are, at bottom, living machines. The 
full title of the book seems to support this view: Micrographia, or 
Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by 
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Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries Thereupon. 
So, apparently, does the organization that moves from the man-
made to the natural and in nature from plants to insects. Within 
categories, moreover, there is no principle of order, a lack of 
organization that reinforces the idea that Hooke is neither a proto-
botanist nor a proto-entomologist; he simply chose what was ready 
at hand to illustrate the power and range of magnifying lenses in 
describing the otherwise invisible characteristics of the micro-
world. Observations 9, 10, and 68, however, force us to seriously 
modify this interpretation. All three sections analyze the nature of 
light, the theoretical subject of Micrographia. This contention 
should not surprise. Better microscopes are contingent, not only on 
improvements in lens manufacture, but on advances in our 
understanding of light, both as it passes through a lens, and more 
generally. Micrographia is not only about observations, but about 
observation.  
In Figure 4, the behavior of light is analyzed theoretically. For 
Hooke, light is a rapid vibratory pulse proceeding outward from the 
illuminating object, much as ripples expand outward when a stone 
is dropped in water. When this pulse hits the cornea, a lens, it 
refracts: the rays that hit the retina at D register blue, while those 
that hit the retina at F register as red. For Hooke blue and red are 
the only two colors; all others are derived from these. We have here 
an example of geometry employed in the service of theory.  
 
Figure 4. Light rays hit the retina. (Hooke, Micrographia, 1961, 
between pages 60–61). 
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The corneal lens can distort: the myopic suffer from this 
problem. Since the atmosphere is also a lens, it can also distort, an 
effect that can undermine the accuracy of observations. To make his 
case, Hooke experiments, using the apparatus depicted in Figure 5. 
To drive out the air in the glass bubble, he vaporizes water. Then he 
seals the now airless bubble. When he peers through the peep-hole 
at A, he sees the whole object C, from F to G (below I but missing in 
the diagram). When Hooke unseals the bubble, letting in the air, he 
can see only a segment HI. From this experiment, Hooke draws the 
following conclusion: since it is “more likely that there is a 
continual increase of rarity in the parts of the air the further they 
are removed from the surface of the earth, it will hence necessarily 
follow that … the ray of light passing obliquely through the air also, 
which is of very different density, will be continually and infinitely 
inflected or bended from a straight or direct motion” (1961, 228). In 
setting up the experiment, Hooke has created a model of the 
atmosphere, a stroke of experimental ingenuity: he has 
“consider[ed] the atmosphere as a transparent shell encompassing 
an opacious globe [the earth]” (Hooke, 1961, 230).  
 
 
Figure 5. An experiment showing that the atmosphere is a distorting 
lens. (Hooke, Micrographia, between pages 220 and 221). 
 
Hooke’s observations can be seriously off-base. He makes three 
mistakes in his description of the louse: he gets its feeding 
mechanism wrong, identifies a non-existent liver or pancreas, and 
sees an imaginary filling of veins and arteries as the creature feeds 
(Jervis, 2013, 2557–58). Hooke’s theories are also subject to error. 
Light is not a pulse or a ray; it consists of photons, massless 
particles. It has always been the case—it is in fact still the case—that 
much of science, though ever so carefully argued into place, has 
been over time shown to be in error. “Overwhelmingly,” notes 
physicist and philosopher Arthur Fine, “the results of the 
conscientious pursuit of scientific inquiry are failures: failed 
theories, failed hypotheses, failed conjectures, inaccurate 
measurements, incorrect estimations of parameters, fallacious 
causal inferences, and so forth”. What requires explaining, he avers, 
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is why “the very same methods” occasionally produce “a pattern of 
successes” (Fine, 1986, 119). 
That they do on occasion succeed, however, is beyond question; 
equally beyond question now are the nature of light and louse 
anatomy. Observation, experiment, and theory have over time led 
to conclusions that placed them beyond argument. Sometimes, as 
with the discovery of X-rays, they were immediately so. But hardly 
ever is acceptance immediate, a fact that accounts for the frequent 
long delay in Nobel awards. In his mordant and malicious 
Postmodern Pooh, Frederick Crews satirizes rhetorical and literary 
critics who presume to analyze science: 
You may have believed, for instance, that the DNA 
molecule possesses a certain eternal structure that was 
definitively revealed by Watson and Crick. But as 
science-as-literature specialist Alan G. Gross has shown, 
“the sense that a molecule of this structure exists at all, 
the sense of its reality, is an effect only of words, 
numbers, and pictures judiciously used with persuasive 
effect (Crews, 2001, 171). 
If Gross is asserting that the structure of DNA is not now beyond 
question, the barb is well deserved. But it is not true that Watson 
and Crick “definitively revealed” anything whatever in their initial 
paper. Certainly they did not assert that their conclusion was 
beyond argument. But if it was not beyond argument in 1953 when 
the structure was announced, it was beyond argument in 1962 
when their Nobel Prize was awarded.  
We now turn to those aspects of Micrographia that can 
legitimately be called rhetorical, aspects that can never be beyond 
argument. To do so, we must first question Jordynn Jack’s view 
that Hooke provides us with a “pedagogy of sight,” that he 
“provided amateur microscopists with a guidebook they could use 
to help them interpret what they saw” (Jack, 1985, 195). While it is 
true that Hooke opens the door to the wide dissemination of the 
microscopic skills he practices, in fact, in the two decades following 
the publication of Micrographia, no such network emerged. The 
only microscope studies that appeared in the Transactions were by 
produced Anton van Leeuwenhoek and Edward Tyson, both 
distinguished scientists and members of the Royal Society. This is a 
period that includes a time when Hooke was the editor of the 
journal (or rather its substitute when the journal temporarily 
ceased publication). 
This failure to teach should come as no surprise. Until the end of 
the 19th century, microscopes were unreliable; it was an open 
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question whether they were tools or toys. Indeed, in 1800, the great 
anatomist, Xavier Bichat, forbade microscopes in his laboratory. 
Ian Hacking tells us that “even up to the 1860s there were serious 
debates as to whether globules seen through a microscope were 
artifacts of the instrument or genuine elements of living material. 
(They were artifacts)” (Hacking, 1983, 194). Moreover, since most 
living material is transparent, it was not until after the 1860s that 
anything much was seen, as it was not until then that aniline dyes 
were available. For the ladies and gentlemen of the 17th and 18th 
centuries, microscopes were toys accompanied by boxes of ready-
made slides. Without them, they would have seen nothing 
whatever. Even today, the idea is laughable that someone untrained 
can place a drop of pond water on a slide and see little creatures 
squirming about (Hacking, 1983, 192). 
There is second reason for the absence of a network of 
collaborating microscopists. Micrographia is not a manual at all; it 
is a different genre altogether. A proper contrast is with Agricola’s 
De Re Metallica, a true manual that explains the mining, smelting, 
and working of metals so expertly that it was translated into 
German and Italian, and reigned supreme for 180 years as the guide 
to the mining and processing of metals (Agricola, 1912). De Re 
Metallica is a detailed description of a complex practice, 
accompanied by equally detailed explanatory woodcuts. Here is an 
example of Agricola’s meticulous prose along with Figure 6, its 
accompanying illustration: 
The metal which is dug out in a pure or crude state, to 
which class belong native silver, silver glance, and gray 
silver, is placed on a stone by the mine foreman and 
flattened out by pounding with heavy square hammers, 
These masses, when they have thus been flattened out 
like plates, are placed either on the stump of a tree, and 
cut into pieces by pounding an iron chisel into them with 
a hammer, or else they are cut with an iron tool similar 
to a pair of shears. One blade of these shears is three feet 
long, and is firmly fixed to a stump, and the other blade 
which cuts the metal is six feet long (Agricola, 1912, 
269). 
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Figure 6. Metal processing (Agricola, De Re Metallica, 1912, 269). 
Even this example does not fully exemplify the difficulty of 
communicating a complex practice. Manuals are never sufficient for 
transfer. Toys ‘R Us is a firm in the process of transferring its 
accounting department from America to India. No manual was 
sufficient; instead, a young woman from India shadowed an 
accountant, recording every keystroke, taking screen shots of her 
computer, accompanied by detailed notes of every aspect of her 
behavior: 
 “She just pulled up a chair in front of my computer,” 
said the accountant, 49, who had worked for the 
company for than 15 years. “She shadowed me 
everywhere, even to the ladies’ room.” 
Another young lady from India made a digital recording of another 
accountant’s work day, transmitted to India, where others 
mimicked the accountant’s tasks (Preston, 2015, A1).  
Micrographia is two things at once: a work of science and a 
work of deliberative rhetoric, a genre designed to exhort its readers 
to support the aims of the newly-founded Royal Society because 
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those aims strengthen our conviction that the world is God’s 
intricate handiwork. In Micrographia, character persuades: Hooke 
is its modest hero, an imagined Hooke careful to stress his limits as 
a scientist but equally careful to point out that those limits need not 
undermine the value of his endeavors: 
I here present to the world my imperfect endeavors, 
which though they shall prove no other way 
considerable, yet I hope they may be in some measure 
useful to the main design of a reformation in philosophy 
[that is, science], if it be only by showing that there is not 
so much required towards it any strength of imagination 
or exactness of method or depth of contemplation 
(though the addition of these, where they can be had 
must needs produce a much more perfect composure) as 
a sincere hand and a faithful eye to examine and to 
record the things themselves as they appear (Hooke, 
1961, viii). 
It is no accident that in this passage Hooke resorts to two devices of 
style, twin verbal turns that underline his devotion to careful 
manipulation and visual fidelity, the two pillars on which 
microscopy must rest if it is to accurately track the contours of 
God’s creation, the natural world.  
The organization of Micrographia is equally a means of 
persuasion. The book begins with human artifacts such as razors 
and pins. Despite their apparent perfection, these are shown to be 
imperfect under the microscope. These are contrasted with plants 
and insects, whose structures reveal God the Designer: 
Nature does not only work mechanically, but by such 
excellent and most stupendous contrivances that it were 
impossible for all the reason in the world to find out any 
contrivance to do the same thing that should have more 
convenient properties. And can any be so sottish as to 
think all those things the products of chance? (Hooke, 
1961, 171–72) 
This revelation of God’s handiwork generates awe, a persuasive 
emotion triggered by the vastness of His enterprise and by its 
complexity, a vastness and complexity only the microscope reveals. 
This exemplification of His power overwhelms us, forcing us to 
realize that science is itself a kind of worship (Keltner and Haidt, 
2003; Piff et al., 2015). Hooke finds these living mechanisms not 
only intricate, but beautiful, an aesthetic appeal that is equally 
persuasive: “And indeed, you can hardly look at the scales of any 
fish, but you may discover abundance of curiosity and beautifying; 
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and not only in these fishes, but in the shells and crusts or armor of 
most sorts of marine animals so invested” (Hooke, 1961, 163). This 
feeling applies not to the quality of the image, as in fine art, but to 
the plant or animal being depicted. It is a beauty God has created. 
Hooke’s mechanical philosophy is a heuristic; the assertion that 
it is probative is rhetorical. The view that God is a master craftsman 
cannot be sustained in the face of numerous defects in human 
anatomy. The existence for example of the vermiform appendix and 
of wisdom teeth are examples. Neither can the reduction of life to 
its mechanical expression be sustained. Philosopher Thomas Nagel 
explains: 
The inescapable fact that has to be accommodated in any 
complete conception of the universe is that the 
appearance of living organisms has eventually given rise 
to consciousness, desire, action, and the formation of 
both beliefs and intentions on the basis of reasons. . . . 
This is not just anthropocentric triumphalism. The 
entire animal kingdom, the endless generations of 
insects and spiders in their enormous, extravagant 
populations, all pose this same question about the order 
of nature (Nagel, 2012, 32). 
 It seems unarguable that such characteristics cannot the 
consequence of the operation of “springs” and” wheels.” But if this 
is so, there must be “a cosmic predisposition to the formation of 
life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable from them” 
(Nagel, 2012, 123). This conclusion does not negate naturalism, but 
it does show materialism can only be part of any explanation of who 
we and our fellow creatures are. The mechanical philosophy 
nonetheless remains a powerful heuristic in biology, one that, as 
Figure 3 clearly shows, has maintained its strength to this day. 
Micrographia is one of a triumvirate of publications the Royal 
Society generated, each with deliberative intent. In its fifth year, the 
Society produced, not only Micrographia, but the first issue of 
Philosophical Transactions. While the content of the Transactions 
was not of course deliberative, the act of publication was an 
affirmation that science mattered, both in Restoration England and 
in the learned world at large. The Society’s seventh year saw its 
third deliberative publication, Thomas Sprat’s History of the Royal 
Society. While Hooke focused on the activities of the Society, the 
pursuit of knowledge of the natural world, Sprat trained his 
attention on the social and political context that made this pursuit 
desirable. This three-pronged rhetorical assault was successful: It 
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established the Society as the robust rival of the soon to be 
established French Académie des Sciences.  
Global Warming: The Rhetoric of Science Policy 
Weather is about whether it is going to rain tomorrow; climate is 
about the average temperature a thousand years ago and a hundred 
years from now. Climate is a tougher nut to crack. Accurate records 
may go back a couple of hundred years, but only in some places, 
hardly everywhere. Beyond that period, proxies like tree rings must 
suffice. All of this data, however, no matter how accurate, is 
meaningless by itself. However accurate, this data takes on 
meaning only when inserted in a computer model. P.N. Edwards 
puts it well in The Vast Machine: climate science is “models almost 
all the way down. In this very important sense, comprehensive 
model building is a central practice of global knowledge 
infrastructures” (Edwards, 2013, 421). But model builders must 
perform a “difficult balancing act” (Edwards, 2013, 175). If they 
want their model to have better resolution, they must sacrifice 
complexity; if they want more complexity, they must sacrifice 
resolution. Given the tsunami of data that must be fed into any 
model, it is no wonder that “tiny errors that occur with each 
rounding can accumulate to a problematic degree” (Edwards, 2013, 
175). Moreover, even if global warming happens to be real, it is not 
necessarily anthropogenic. To determine whether there is a human 
fingerprint amid the noise of other factors, you must 
calculate the amount of “noise” produced by natural 
variability in the control runs [of the model]. If your 
fingerprint signal remains after subtracting this noise, 
you’ve found a candidate for a unique anthropogenic 
effect, one that could not be caused by any known 
combination of natural events. Then you check the 
observational data. If you see the same fingerprint there, 
you’ve found some evidence of anthropogenic change 
(Edwards, 2013, 335). 
These difficulties are reflected in the history of climate science. In 
1970, an article in Science stated that “Our estimates of CO2 
production by natural causes, such as volcanic exhalations and 
organic decay are very inaccurate; hence the ratio of these natural 
effects to anthropogenic effects remains to be established” 
(Landsberg, 1970, 1268). Four years later, in another article 
uncertainty still prevailed: “To know whether the observed 
temperature change at the earth’s surface was the result of changes 
in the greenhouse effect . . . is probably beyond our present 
capability of measurement” (Bryson, 1974, 756). In 1988, Science 
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still reported serious measurement problems (Kerr, 1988a; 1988b). 
In 1990, Philip Abelson, then Science Deputy Editor, expressed 
continuing doubts. By 1995, however, with the first report of The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the tide had turned. 
By that time, “the balance of evidence suggest[ed] a discernable 
human influence on global climate” (IGPCC, 1995, 22). By the 2001 
report, there was “new and stronger evidence” for a human 
contribution (IGPCC, 2001, 5). By the 2007 report, anthropocentric 
global warming could be asserted with “very high confidence;” it 
was the consensus of 90% of the scientists (IGPCC, 2007, 37). By 
the 2014 report, there was high confidence that “about half of the 
anthropogenic cumulative CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2010 
occurred in the last 40 years” (IGPCC, 2010, 7). For a certainty high 
enough to make action advisable, the last report was crucial. In 
2007, American Scientist called for action. But Scientific American 
published its call for action as late as 2009. While today models of 
anthropogenic global warming converge on a consensus 
permanently beyond argument, in 2007, legitimate contention was 
still possible; anthropogenic global warming was still not beyond 
argument. The “contrarian” Steve McIntyre is a case in point. 
Rhetorical analysis was still appropriate. 
The first of McIntyre’s interventions concerns a “Millennial 
Temperature Reconstruction Intercomparison and Evaluation,” an 
article that eventually appeared in the well-respected specialty 
journal, Climate of the Past (Juckes et al., 2007; McIntyre, 2006). 
In a comment during open peer review, McIntyre finds the paper 
scientifically and morally defective, establishing its academic 
credibility on false pretenses. The parallel syntax, the use of 
quotation marks to convey irony, and the metaphor from bank 
fraud hint at the rhetorical feast that awaits anyone who examines 
online peer review documents. 
Juckes et al. have already withdrawn a false allegation 
that we had failed to archive our source code and, after 
the above admission, should also have withdrawn these 
further false allegations concerning supposed “errors.” 
In making these allegations, Juckes et al. also 
perpetuated prior “academic check-kiting” by Wahl and 
Ammann (Juckes et al., 2007). 
 Of the paper itself, McIntyre is dismissive: “Given the already 
crowded controversy in this field, I see little purpose in reviving an 
issue in peer-reviewed literature that is not actually in controversy 
and which has negligible impact on any result” (McIntyre, 2006, 
s701–s702). 
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Unlike McIntyre, the corresponding author, Martin Juckes, 
maintains civility in his replies to criticisms. In his relatively brief 
responses to individual comments, he adopts an even tone that 
sends a message: McIntyre’s accusations have not changed his 
convictions or disturbed his equanimity. At one point, however, 
Juckes does become exasperated. McIntyre ends his final 
commentary with a reference to his blog: “There has been extensive 
discussion of various aspects of Juckes et al. at 
www.climateaudit.org—see http://www.climateaudit.org/?cat=36.” 
Juckes responds dismissively, “Extensive and ill-informed,” a 
juxtaposition that conveys deep-seated contempt and anger 
(McIntyre, 2006, s702; Juckes et al., 2007). 
This is not to say that McIntyre’s criticisms are without 
foundation. The question is not whether he is annoyed or angry, but 
whether his anger and annoyance are justified. Despite their 
polemical edge, his remarks contribute to the paper’s considerable 
improvement from its first to its final draft. Juckes acknowledges 
and agrees to correct at least some of the errors McIntyre alleges, as 
in the case of their initial geographical proxy locations. 
Furthermore, he makes some changes based on McIntyre’s 
criticism of proxy selection.  
Beginning in 2005, McIntyre initiated a campaign to force the 
prestigious Goddard Institute for Space Studies to share its data so 
that an audit could be performed. Goddard resisted at first but a 
cataract of negative publicity generated by McIntyre’s blog forced 
them to comply in 2007. Errors were found. In this case, McIntyre’s 
blog provided an unprecedented forum for any 
interested party to signal audit-worthy issues, and 
Climate Audit and other blogs uncovered further errors 
made by GISS in an early release of October 2008 data. 
GISS thanked McIntyre publically for these 
contributions. In response to the calls of Climate Audit 
and other blogs for greater transparency many climate 
centers have begun mounting data and even some 
climate models on public web servers (Edwards, 2013, 
424). 
Here we have an interesting instance of the rhetorical stasis of 
jurisdiction. Having failed to persuade through professional 
channels, McIntyre creates a new forum professionals cannot 
control, a blog, an instance of the persuasive power the internet can 
unleash. 
Even as late as 2014—even as late as yesterday—it was still 
possible legitimately to debate national and international policy, 
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given the reality of anthropocentric global warming. John Christy is 
an example of a scientist who legitimately deviates from the 
consensus that a crisis is at hand. Christy is a respected climate 
scientist. His co-authored 2005 paper on the problems of climate 
measurement, published in The Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Association, the most prestigious journal in climate 
science, was cited a more than respectable 83 times (Thorne et al., 
2005). A 2011 review article on climate measurement, itself cited 58 
times cites 31 articles authored or co-authored by Christy on the 
subject (Thorne et al., 2011). In 2007, Christy acknowledges that 
global warming is real and that there is a definite human footprint; 
in 2009 he deplores the politicization of the issue, whether it comes 
from those he feels push the IPCC in the direction of advocacy or 
those whose skepticism is merely ideological (Revkin, 2007; 2009a; 
2009b; Rudolf, 2011). While in 2014 he concurs that anthropogenic 
global warming is real, he disapproves of drastic measures designed 
to curb carbon emissions, believing that the disruptions they cause 
cannot justify their implementation: 
Dr. Christy argues that reining in carbon emissions is 
both futile and unnecessary, and that money is better 
spent adapting to what he says will be moderately higher 
temperatures. Among other initiatives, he said, the 
authorities could limit development in coastal and 
hurricane-prone areas, expand flood plains, make 
manufactured housing more resistant to tornadoes and 
high winds, and make farms in arid regions less 
dependent on imported water — or move production to 
rainier places (Wines, 2014; see also Revkin, 2005).  
While this view can be contested—while it is in fact contested most 
vigorously—it is also the view of David Archer, a professor of 
geophysical sciences at the University of Chicago: 
A century of global warming in the United States will 
probably involve uncomfortable summers, maybe some 
drought, and colorful headlines about hurricanes. 
Holland is an example of a prosperous country that has 
managed to build and maintain dikes, to keep the sea out 
of their low-lying landscape. Sea level rise in Bangladesh 
is less likely to be defended against, because of the 
length of the coastline, and the lack of economic 
resources to throw at the problem (Archer, 2009, 53). 
While the fact of anthropogenic global warming is no longer in 
question, the public policies that follow from that fact remain a 
target for rhetorical analysis; nations must be persuaded that action 
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on global warming trumps other priorities. Moreover, scientists are 
involved in these debates, not only as scientists, but as advocates. 
Rhetorical analysis is always appropriate in both of these cases. 
Conclusion: The Humanities 
Even when we leave the sciences behind, we do not leave behind 
matters that are permanently beyond argument. Sharing this status 
are John Austin’s discovery of speech acts and Paul Grice’s, of 
conversation implicatures. Also beyond argument is David Hume’s 
case against induction: 
From a body of like color and consistency with bread, we 
expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a 
step or progress of the mind which wants to be 
explained. When a man says, I have formed, in all past 
instances, such sensible qualities, conjoined with such 
secret powers, and when he says, similar sensible 
qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret 
powers, he is not guilty of a tautology, nor are these 
propositions in any respect the same. You say that the 
one proposition is an inference from the other; but you 
must confess that the inference is not intuitive, neither is 
it demonstrative. Of what nature is it then? To say it is 
experimental is begging the question. For all inferences 
from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the 
future will resemble the past and that similar powers will 
be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be 
any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and 
that the past may be no guide for the future, all 
experience becomes useless and can give rise to no 
inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that 
any arguments from experience can prove this 
resemblance of the past to the future, since all these 
arguments are founded on the supposition of that 
resemblance (Hume, 1955, 51; his emphasis). 
None of these instances of claims beyond argument undermines 
the role rhetoric can play in the analysis of issues of policy 
generated by scientific claims, however well founded, nor its role in 
the analysis of scientific claims still in contention, nor its role in 
analyzing articles and books in which scientific and rhetorical 
claims exist side by side. 
Copyright © 2016 Alan G. Gross 
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